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Abstract 26 
Background: Lower numerical ability is associated with poorer understanding of 27 
health statistics, such as risk reductions of medical treatment. For many people, despite good 28 
numeracy skills, math provokes anxiety that impedes an ability to evaluate numerical 29 
information. Math anxious individuals also report less confidence in their ability to perform 30 
math tasks. We hypothesized that, independent of objective numeracy, math anxiety would 31 
be associated with poorer responding and lower confidence when calculating risk reductions 32 
of medical treatments. Methods: Objective numeracy was assessed using an 11-item 33 
objective numeracy scale. A 13-item self-report scale was used to assess math-anxiety. In 34 
Experiment 1, participants were asked to interpret the baseline risk of disease and risk 35 
reductions associated with treatment options. Participants in Experiment 2 were additionally 36 
provided a graphical display designed to facilitate the processing of math information and 37 
alleviate effects of math anxiety. Confidence ratings were provided on a 7-point scale. 38 
Results: Individuals of higher objective numeracy were more likely to respond correctly to 39 
baseline risks and risk reductions associated with treatment options and were more confident 40 
in their interpretations. Individuals who scored high in math anxiety were instead less likely 41 
to correctly interpret the baseline risks and risk reductions and were less confident in their 42 
risk calculations as well as in their assessments of the effectiveness of treatment options. 43 
Math anxiety predicted confidence levels but not correct responding when controlling for 44 
objective numeracy. The graphical display was most effective in increasing confidence 45 
among math anxious individuals. Conclusions: The findings suggest that math anxiety is 46 
associated with poorer medical risk interpretation, but is more strongly related to confidence 47 
in interpretations.  48 
Key words: Risk communication; Math anxiety; Numeracy; Graphical displays; 49 
Confidence 50 
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Making informed decisions about healthcare and treatment on the basis of health 51 
statistics requires a basic understanding of statistical concepts such as percentages, 52 
probabilities, and frequencies. Poor numeracy has been linked to miscalculations of health 53 
statistics.
1-5
 Yet for many people, despite possessing good numeracy skills, math provokes 54 
anxiety and other negative emotions that can impede reasoning about numerical information.
6
 55 
The current research investigates the potential relationship between math anxiety and 56 
understanding of health-related statistical information.  57 
As much as two thirds of adults report experiencing feelings of anxiety when faced 58 
with numerical information.
7
 Math anxiety, typically defined as “feelings of tension, 59 
apprehension, or fear that interferes with math performance,”6 is often triggered by negative 60 
experiences with math education, and is moderately associated with poorer numerical 61 
ability.
8
 The link between math anxiety and numerical ability is perhaps partly due to a 62 
tendency for math anxious individuals to avoid math education.
9
 However, anxious thoughts 63 
and worries that are symptomatic of math anxiety further impede math performance by 64 
occupying limited working memory resources.
10-13
 Ashcraft and Kirk
10
 showed that 65 
performing a secondary load task whilst solving math problems was more detrimental for 66 
individuals who were high rather than low in math anxiety, suggesting that for these 67 
individuals, worries and other intrusive thoughts disrupt executive processes. Thus, beyond 68 
numeracy skills, math anxiety can have detrimental effects on people’s ability to perform 69 
math tasks. 70 
Many of the daily health choices that people make are informed by statistical claims 71 
(e.g., a toothpaste that reduces risk of tooth decay), and serious decisions about health and 72 
medical care often require that patients evaluate statistical risks and benefits associated with 73 
treatment options.
14
 A wealth of research has linked poor objective numeracy to 74 
4 
 
misunderstanding of medical risks, such as risk reductions associated with medical 75 
screening
2-5
 and treatment.
15
  76 
However, the focus on objective numeracy skills may have neglected the role that 77 
affective factors (e.g., anxiety) play in risk communication and medical decision-making.
16,17
 78 
Silk and Parrot
18
 found that higher scores on a math anxiety scale predicted poorer 79 
responding to numerical statements about genetically modified food risks (e.g., ‘which person 80 
was most sensitive to the genetically modified soybeans?’). Math anxiety predicted poorer 81 
responding even when controlling for objective numeracy,
18
 suggesting that at least some of 82 
the detrimental effects of math anxiety could not be explained by numerical ability.  83 
Perhaps not surprisingly, individuals who are math anxious typically report less 84 
confidence in their ability to perform math tasks.
19,20
 In the health domain, nursing students 85 
who indicated higher levels of math anxiety were both more likely to fail a drug calculation 86 
test and were less confident in their ability to perform such medical calculations.
21
 Math 87 
anxious individuals may also be less confident in their actual responses, such as in their 88 
calculations of treatment risk reductions. This could have serious ramifications for people’s 89 
real-world decision making about their health. If math anxious individuals are less confident 90 
in their understanding of the efficacy of treatment options, they may also be less willing to 91 
comply with potentially effective treatments.  92 
In the current research, we tested for an association between math anxiety and 93 
understanding of risk reductions as a result of medical treatment. Our overarching hypotheses 94 
were that independent of objective numeracy; higher math anxiety would be associated with 95 
(a) poorer responding and (b) lower confidence when calculating risk reductions of medical 96 
treatments. 97 
 98 
 99 
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Experiment 1 100 
We used two scenarios in Experiment 1: an impersonal scenario about a man who 101 
faces a medical decision situation, and a personal scenario in which participants were 102 
instructed to imagine experiencing anxiety-provoking medical symptoms. People make 103 
serious decisions about their own health in situations of intense stress and anxiety (e.g., 104 
choosing among cancer treatments). Such anxiety could potentially affect correct responding 105 
to medical risk information by inducing worry, concern, and other intrusive thoughts, perhaps 106 
particularly for math anxious individuals. Including a personal scenario in Experiment 1 also 107 
enabled us to test for effects of math anxiety using study materials that are more 108 
representative than abstract scenarios of real-world medical situations. 109 
Method 110 
Participants 111 
Two hundred one US participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk 112 
(AMT) and were each compensated $0.50. Elsewhere, the reliability, quality, and 113 
representativeness of participant data provided by AMT has been demonstrated by 114 
comparison with other recruitment methods.
22,23
 Table 1 provides the sample characteristics. 115 
Materials and Procedure 116 
Objective numeracy. Objective numeracy was assessed using the 11-item objective 117 
numeracy scale developed by Lipkus et al.
3
 The scale comprises three general questions that 118 
assess understanding of chance and probability (e.g., ‘out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do 119 
you think a fair, 6-sided die would come up even? 2, 4, or 6’), and eight items specific to 120 
disease risk that assess ability to interpret risks (e.g., ‘which of the following represents the 121 
biggest risk of getting a disease? 1, 5, or 10%’), convert percentages to frequencies (e.g., ‘if 122 
the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 123 
6 
 
disease out of 100 people) and vice versa. Responses, coded as correct (numeric value of 1) 124 
or incorrect (numeric value of 0), were summed across the 11 items for overall scores.  125 
Math anxiety. Existing scales (e.g., the Mathematical Anxiety Rating Scale 126 
[MARS])
24-27
 assess math anxiety in educational settings (e.g., ‘having to use the tables in the 127 
back of a math book’) that are not applicable to adult samples. Thus, we composed the Adult 128 
Everyday Math Anxiety Scale (AEMAS) based on existing scales that would be suitable for 129 
use with individuals who are no longer in education. The AEMAS comprised 13-items that 130 
assess self-reported anxiety associated with numerical formats (e.g., ‘having to work with 131 
percentages’), everyday tasks (e.g., ‘having to work out prices in a foreign currency’), and the 132 
workplace (e.g., ‘having to present numerical information at a work meeting’). The 133 
instructions (i.e., ‘Please rate each item in terms of how anxious you would feel during the 134 
event specified’), and the rating scale were modelled on the Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale 135 
(AMAS).
27
 Participants rated their self-reported anxiety for each item on a 5-point scale 136 
(1=‘low anxiety’, 2=‘some anxiety’, 3=‘moderate anxiety’, 4=‘quite a bit of anxiety’, 137 
5=‘high anxiety’). Overall math anxiety scores were averaged across the 13-items. 138 
Risk scenarios. Participants then completed two medical scenarios (see 139 
supplementary material). The first was an impersonal scenario that described a fictitious man 140 
named Jack, who visits his doctor with symptoms of numbness and pain in his leg and is 141 
informed by his physician that he has an infection caused by diabetes. Participants were told 142 
that without treatment Jack has a 60% chance that his leg will need to be amputated (i.e., the 143 
baseline risk). Participants were then informed about two treatments available to Jack, one of 144 
which was presented as an absolute risk reduction: 145 
[Absolute risk reduction] ‘Jack's chance of surviving without needing to have his 146 
leg amputated is increased TO 80%’ 147 
The other treatment was presented as a relative risk reduction: 148 
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[Relative risk reduction] ‘Jack's chance of surviving without needing to have his 149 
leg amputated is increased BY 25%’ 150 
For the baseline risk and each treatment, participants were asked: ‘how many people 151 
among 1,000 like Jack will need to have their leg amputated?’. Thus, participants were 152 
required to calculate the risk that the leg would be lost on the basis of statistics about the 153 
chances of survival. This was done in order to ensure that some mental calculation was 154 
required to compute both the absolute and relative risk reductions. Participants rated their 155 
confidence in each treatment response on a 7-point scale (1=‘not at all confident’, 7=‘very 156 
confident’).  157 
The second scenario, a personal scenario designed to evoke anxiety, asked 158 
participants to imagine: 159 
  Yesterday, whilst at home, you experienced an episode of dizziness that 160 
affected your balance. You also had a sudden loss of vision, which made you feel 161 
disorientated and fearful as you have not felt these symptoms before. Imagine 162 
what it would be like to experience these symptoms. What kind of serious medical 163 
condition might you have? Please list at least one. 164 
 165 
1/ ________ 2/ ________ 3/ ________ 166 
Participants were asked to list at least one possible medical condition as a method of 167 
engaging them with the scenario. They were then asked to imagine they visit their physician 168 
with the symptoms mentioned above and are immediately referred to a neurologist, who 169 
confirms that they have had a stroke, and that without treatment they have a 70% chance of 170 
having another stroke in the near future (i.e., the baseline risk). Participants identified the 171 
baseline risk in a similar manner to the first scenario and similarly were asked to calculate the 172 
outcomes of two treatment options, one presented as an absolute risk reduction and the other 173 
as a relative risk reduction. The absolute and relative risk items were presented in a randomly 174 
generated order for each participant and each scenario provided a different set of risk 175 
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statistics (set 1, baseline =60%, absolute=80%, relative=25%; set 2, baseline=70%, 176 
absolute=40%, relative=50%).   177 
Finally, participants reported how anxious they felt when reading each scenario on a 178 
sliding scale (0=not at all anxious, 100=extremely anxious) and provided their age, gender, 179 
educational level, and household income. The objective numeracy scale was completed first, 180 
followed by the math anxiety scale, and then the risk scenarios. Ethical approval was awarded 181 
by the institution ethics committee and all participants provided informed consent. 182 
Analytic strategy 183 
Objective numeracy scores that fell outside 1.5 times the inter-quartile range of the 184 
scale were deemed outliers. After removal of three outliers, objective numeracy scores were 185 
negatively skewed ( =9.68, s=10, skewness=-0.93, standard error [SE]=0.17) and thus were 186 
negative log-transformed (skewness=0.04) for use in all statistical analyses. A random effects 187 
logit model was conducted on participants’ risk responses (1=correct, 0=incorrect) to account 188 
for clustering within participants. Dummy variables were used to identify responses to the 189 
baseline and relative risk in comparison with the absolute risk. Predictors were included for 190 
objective numeracy, math anxiety, and scenario context (1=personal, 0=impersonal). All 191 
possible two-way interaction terms were included in a second block. Nonsignificant 192 
interactions were removed in subsequent blocks to improve model parsimony. Following a 193 
similar procedure, a random effects linear regression model was conducted on participants’ 194 
ratings of confidence in their treatment responses. 195 
Results 196 
The mean group ratings for each of the AEMAS scale items are provided in Table 2. 197 
The overall math anxiety score ( =2.19, s=0.83) was close to the mid-point of the scale (i.e., 198 
numeric value of 2.5; indicating ‘some’ to ‘moderate’ anxiety). All the item-total correlations 199 
were positive and ranged .55 to .80, indicating that each item correlated highly with the 200 
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overall scale. The 13-item scale demonstrated high internal reliability (Cronbach’s α=0.93). 201 
Math anxiety was associated with lower objective numeracy, education, income, and being 202 
female, whereas objective numeracy was associated only with higher income (Table 3).  203 
Manipulation check. Higher anxiety was reported for the personal scenario ( =42.71, 204 
s=31.56) than for the impersonal scenario ( =35.10, s=30.12; t(200)=6.17, p<.001). 205 
Risk scenarios. Higher objective numeracy was associated with correct responding to 206 
the risk items (d=0.71; Table 4: Model 1a)
28
, whereas math anxiety was associated with 207 
poorer responding (d=0.37; Table 4: Model 2a). Objective numeracy, but not math anxiety, 208 
predicted significantly when both were included together (Table 4: Model 3a). Participants 209 
were more likely to provide correct responses to the baseline risk (89% correct) and less 210 
likely to provide correct responses to the relative risk (16% correct) in comparison to the 211 
absolute risk (49% correct; Table 4; Model 3a). Responses were not affected by scenario 212 
context.  213 
A minority of participants provided relative risk responses in the impersonal (20%) 214 
and personal (26%) scenarios that corresponded with an alternative interpretation, in which 215 
the relative risk is subtracted in absolute terms from the baseline risk. Alternative responding 216 
was not related to objective numeracy or math anxiety. 217 
Higher objective numeracy was associated with greater confidence in risk responses, 218 
whereas math anxiety was associated with lower confidence (Table 5: Model 1a). Participants 219 
were more confident in their responses to the absolute risk ( =5.01, s=1.90) than in their 220 
responses to the relative risk ( =4.69, s=1.89; Table 5: Model 1a). Math anxiety interacted 221 
with the relative versus absolute risk items (Table 5: Model 2a), such that math anxiety was 222 
more strongly related to confidence in relative risk (b=-0.79, 95% confidence intervals [CI]= 223 
-1.05: -0.53, p<.001) than in absolute risk (b=-.61, 95% CI= -0.88: -0.34, p<.001) responses. 224 
 225 
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Experiment 2 226 
In Experiment 2, we provided participants with a graphical representation of risk 227 
information (see Figure 1 and supplementary material) in an attempt to alleviate some of the 228 
detrimental effects of math anxiety. Graphical displays that present numerical risks visually 229 
reduce the emphasis on math information, and appear to be most effective among individuals 230 
of low numerical ability.
2,15
 Since math anxiety is triggered by math material, visually 231 
displaying treatment information (in addition to the numerical risks) may reduce the negative 232 
impacts of math anxiety on risk calculations and potentially increase confidence in people’s 233 
responses. 234 
In our study, we followed Galesic et al.
15
 and used two types of graphical displays: a 235 
smaller display with 100 icons, and a larger display with 1,000 icons (see Figure 1). Galesic 236 
et al.
15
 reported that people perceive medical screenings as more effective when presented in 237 
larger (i.e., out of 1,000 cases) as opposed to smaller (i.e., out of 100 cases) displays due to a 238 
ratio-bias, in which frequencies are perceived as greater for larger denominators. Although 239 
Galesic et al.
15
 did not assess numerical ability in this respect, individuals of lower objective 240 
numeracy and higher math anxiety may be more susceptible to such bias as a result of poorer 241 
assessment of numerical information. We employed a similar between-subjects approach to 242 
Galesic et al.
15
 by providing half the participants with the graphical display. In Experiment 1, 243 
participants’ responses were not affected by personalizing the medical scenario context. 244 
Thus, we did not further investigate context effects in Experiment 2. Instead, we presented 245 
participants a scenario about a fictitious cancer, known as ‘Cancer D’.  246 
Participants 247 
 Two hundred ten US participants were recruited online via AMT and were each 248 
compensated $0.50. Table 1 provides the sample characteristics.  249 
 250 
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Materials and Procedure 251 
 As in Experiment 1, participants completed the 11-item objective numeracy scale 252 
developed by Lipkus et al.
3
 and the 13-item AEMAS to assess math anxiety.  253 
 Participants then completed a single medical scenario that asked them to imagine a 254 
patient diagnosed with a fictitious cancer, known as ‘Cancer D’, who has a 60% chance of 255 
dying within one year (i.e., the baseline risk; see supplementary material). Participants were 256 
informed of two treatment options, both presented as an absolute risk reduction (i.e., ‘the 257 
patient’s chance of surviving one year is increased TO 70%), and for all three items were 258 
asked: ‘how many patients among 1,000 who are diagnosed with ‘Cancer D’ will die within 259 
one year?’. Participants also rated the effectiveness of each treatment on a sliding scale 260 
(0=not at all effective, 10=very effective) and provided a confidence rating (on a 7-point 261 
scale; 1=‘not at all confident’, 7=‘very confident’) for each treatment response and 262 
effectiveness rating. The risk statistics for the two treatments were 70% and 80%. It was 263 
ensured that these were presented in a counterbalanced order across participants and differed 264 
for the two treatments. 265 
Half the participants (n=105) were additionally provided a graphical display that 266 
presented visually the baseline risk out of 100 patients, the risk reduction for the first 267 
treatment (Treatment A) out of 100 patients, and the risk reduction for the second treatment 268 
(Treatment B) out of 1,000 patients (Figure 1). Finally, participants provided their 269 
demographic information. The tasks were completed in the same order as in Experiment 1 270 
and all participants provided informed consent. 271 
Analytic strategy 272 
Following the procedure introduced in Experiment 1, 10 outlying objective numeracy 273 
scores were removed. After removal of outliers, objective numeracy scores were negatively 274 
skewed ( =9.24, s=10, skewness=-1.15, SE=0.18) and thus were negative log-transformed 275 
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(skewness=-0.13) for use in all analyses. As in Experiment 1, a random effects logit model 276 
was used to assess correct responding to risk items in the medical scenario. A random effects 277 
linear regression model was used to analyze participants’ treatment effectiveness and 278 
confidence ratings. 279 
Results 280 
The mean group ratings for each of the AEMAS scale items are provided in Table 2. 281 
Consistent with Experiment 1, the overall math anxiety score ( =2.33, s=0.88) was close to 282 
the mid-point of the scale (i.e., numeric value of 2.5). The item-total correlations, which were 283 
all positive, ranged .56 to .77, and the overall scale exhibited high internal reliability 284 
(Cronbach’s α=0.93). Math anxiety was associated with lower objective numeracy and both 285 
math anxiety and objective numeracy were related to being female (Table 3). 286 
Risk Scenarios. Higher objective numeracy was associated with correct responding to 287 
the risk items (d=0.84; Table 4: Model 1b), whereas math anxiety was associated with poorer 288 
responding (d=0.68; Table 4: Model 2b). Objective numeracy, but not math anxiety, 289 
predicted significantly when both were included in the same block (Table 4: Model 3b). 290 
Participants were more likely to respond correctly to the baseline risk (83% correct) and to 291 
the Treatment B risk (79% correct) than they were to respond correctly to the Treatment A 292 
risk (71% correct; Table 4: Model 3b). There were no main effect of the graphical display.  293 
Higher objective numeracy was associated with greater confidence in risk responses 294 
and math anxiety was associated with lower confidence (Table 5: Model 1b). Participants 295 
were more confident in their Treatment B responses ( =5.77, s=1.52) than in their Treatment 296 
A responses ( =5.62, s=1.59; Table 5: Model 1b). The graphical display increased 297 
confidence overall ( =5.84, s=1.38; without graphical display, =5.56, s=1.63; Table 5: 298 
Model 1b), but its effects also interacted with math anxiety (Table 5: Model 2b). Simple 299 
slope analysis revealed that the graphical display increased confidence among high math 300 
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anxious individuals (1 s below mean=6.22, 1 s above mean=5.68; b=-0.27, 95% CI=-0.52: -301 
0.02, p=.031) compared to those not provided the graphical display (1 s below mean=6.24, 1 302 
s above mean=4.62; b=-0.76, 95% CI=-1.08: -0.44, p<.001)  303 
Treatment effectiveness. Higher objective numeracy (b = .47, 95% CI = 0.01: 0.93, p 304 
= .047), but not math anxiety (b = -.10, 95% CI = -0.45: 0.24, p = .551), predicted higher 305 
ratings of treatment effectiveness (R
2
 = 0.03). Lower math anxiety (b = -.51, 95% CI = -0.75: 306 
-0.27, p < .001) and not objective numeracy (b = .17, 95% CI = -0.16: 0.49, p = .316) 307 
predicted greater confidence in treatment ratings (R
2
 = 0.12). 308 
Discussion 309 
A wealth of research in recent years has linked low objective numeracy to poorer 310 
understanding of risk reductions associated with screening and medical treatment.
2-5
 In the 311 
current studies, higher objective numeracy was associated with more accurate understanding 312 
of treatment risks and higher ratings of treatment effectiveness. Highly numerate individuals 313 
were also more confident in their risk calculations. Higher reported math anxiety was instead 314 
associated with poorer understanding of medical risk reductions, but not when controlling for 315 
objective numeracy. Independent of objective numeracy, math anxious individuals were less 316 
confident in their calculations of medical risks and in their ratings of the effectiveness of 317 
medical treatments. 318 
Some types of risk information are better understood than others. For example, risk 319 
reductions are typically better understood when expressed as absolute risks (e.g., a patient’s 320 
chance of surviving is increased to … %) than as relative risks (i.e., … increased by… %).29 321 
Relative risks are also open to multiple interpretations.
1
 Our findings of Experiment 1 322 
confirm that absolute risks are better understood than relative risks, and further suggest that 323 
people who are math anxious are also less confident in their calculations of relative risks than 324 
they are for absolute risks. This finding reaffirms the recommendations made by others that 325 
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risk reductions associated with medical procedures would be best communicated by health 326 
care professionals and by the media in terms of absolute risks.
1 
327 
Graphical displays are designed to reduce the burden on objective numeracy (for an 328 
example, see Figure 1).
15
 The one used presently was highly effective in increasing 329 
confidence among high math anxious individuals. This finding suggests that such methods 330 
may be particularly effective for boosting decision making confidence among individuals 331 
who are easily made anxious by numerical information. Using eye-tracking technology, 332 
Keller and colleagues
30
 showed that low numeracy individuals initially focused more on 333 
graphical as opposed to numerical risks when provided information in both formats. Highly 334 
numerate individuals showed the opposite tendency. The findings of Keller et al.
30
 suggest 335 
that low numeracy individuals may avoid numerical information and be attracted by graphical 336 
displays. We speculate that math anxiety among low numeracy individuals perhaps partly 337 
motivates their seeking of non-numeric formats and their avoidance of numerical formats.  338 
Math anxious individuals often report less confidence in their ability to perform math 339 
tasks.
19,20
 We found that such individuals were also less confident in their actual calculations 340 
of medical risk information. They were less confident also in their ratings of a treatment’s 341 
potential effectiveness, which hints at a worrying possibility that self-doubt could 342 
compromise a patient’s willingness to comply with effective treatments on the basis of 343 
statistical benefits. Further research may seek to explore whether low confidence among the 344 
math anxious also impacts on their willingness to engage in informed decision-making. 345 
Shared decision making is a process that aims to engage patients in decisions about their 346 
healthcare and treatment.
31
 Individuals of lower numerical ability are less willing to adopt an 347 
active role in the shared decision-making process.
32
 Math anxious people, as a consequence 348 
of their lower perceived self-efficacy, may also be reluctant to engage in active decision 349 
making about their health. 350 
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Existing scales assess math anxiety in educational settings,
24
 and specifically in high 351 
school and college samples, which is not applicable to adults who are no longer in education. 352 
Adults face everyday tasks (e.g., ‘having to work out prices in a foreign currency’) as well as 353 
serious decisions about their healthcare and medical treatment, many of which make demands 354 
on one’s ability to evaluate numerical information. Here, we composed a 13-item Adult 355 
Everyday Math Anxiety Scale (AEMAS) based on existing scales that could be used for 356 
adults who are no longer in education. Our analysis of the AEMAS and its association with 357 
risk calculation provides preliminary evidence that it might be used as an effective tool for 358 
assessing adult math anxiety outside of educational settings. However, the AEMAS awaits 359 
further validation and it is hoped that the current research will motivate others to explore the 360 
impacts of math anxiety on behavior in the medical domain as well as in other domains.  361 
In both Experiments, objective numeracy and math anxiety separately predicted 362 
interpretations of medical risk reductions. However, math anxiety no longer predicted 363 
significantly after partialling out effects of objective numeracy. Math anxiety and objective 364 
numeracy were highly correlated (Table 3; see also
33
), which raises statistical concerns about 365 
their inclusion in the same regression model.
34
 Nevertheless, we expected that math anxiety 366 
would have detrimental effects beyond numeracy skills. One possibility is that math anxiety 367 
indirectly impedes performance through its effects on objective numeracy. Math anxious 368 
individuals often avoid math education
9
 and math anxiety is related to lower perceived self-369 
efficacy.
19,20
 In our investigation, math anxiety directly affected confidence in medical risk 370 
calculations. Thus, math anxiety may relate specifically to the perceived understanding of 371 
numerical risks rather than to the quality of interpretations.  372 
Researchers have proposed self-report measures of subjective numeracy that 373 
circumvent anxiety and stress associated with aptitude tests and traditional measures of 374 
objective numeracy.
35
 Subjective numeracy scales have been validated as a proxy for 375 
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objective numeracy in broad age ranges.
36
 However, Peters and Bjalkebring
37
 argue that 376 
subjective numeracy likely comprises multiple facets, including emotional and motivational 377 
factors, in addition to actual numerical ability. In their study, positive emotional attitudes 378 
toward math were more strongly related to subjective than to objective numeracy measures. 379 
We speculate that math anxiety may relate closely to aspects of subjective numeracy. Hence, 380 
math anxiety may be more strongly linked to self-appraisal and motivational factors than to 381 
the quality of risk calculations. Further research may seek to explore how math anxiety 382 
relates to emotional and motivational features of subjective numeracy. Additionally, the links 383 
between math anxiety and people’s willingness to engage in the process of medical decision 384 
making should further be investigated. 385 
There are a number of potential limitations of the current research. First, math anxiety 386 
was assessed after objective numeracy. Consequently, the assessment of numerical ability 387 
may have influenced participants’ subsequent math anxiety levels. This may have partly 388 
contributed to the high correlations we observed between objective numeracy and math 389 
anxiety. Ideally, math anxiety and objective numeracy would be assessed in separate testing 390 
sessions. Second, we assessed objective numeracy with the 11-item Lipkus et al.
3
 scale. 391 
While it is perhaps the most widely used scale for the assessment of objective numeracy, 392 
researchers have observed negative skewness on the scale, such that some scores are close to 393 
the high end of the scale.
38,39
 This was the case also for our current data. Our choice of 394 
objective numeracy scale may have compromised our findings. We found that math anxious 395 
individuals were more confident in their responses to absolute risks than in their relative risk 396 
responses. We did not observe parallel findings for objective numeracy that would suggest 397 
more numerate individuals have better interpretations of relative risks than absolute risks. 398 
Further studies may also consider alternative scales, such as the Berlin Numeracy Test,
40
 that 399 
is purported to overcome these psychometric problems. Third, in Experiment 2, participants 400 
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viewed the smaller, followed by the larger, visual format of the graphical display. Math 401 
anxious individuals characteristically avoid math information
9 
and so in principle could have 402 
benefited more from the larger display had it been presented first. This raises the possibility 403 
of a confounding effect of task order. Fourth, we tested participants from the general public, 404 
rather than study patients in the context that medical decision are normally made. However, 405 
many of these people will face serious decisions about their health. Finally, there are 406 
individual differences in the extent to which people are anxious about their health. Health-407 
related anxiety was not measured in the present study. It is possible that health-related 408 
anxiety interacted with effects of math anxiety. Future research should aim to disentangle 409 
effects of the two types of anxiety that could both influence health-related decisions and risk 410 
perception. Further research may also seek to explore how math anxiety impacts on behavior 411 
among specific patient groups in medical settings, such as patients who must make decisions 412 
about real treatment options and individuals who are at risk of disease (e.g., breast cancer) 413 
and who face preventive medical procedures. The stress associated with making actual 414 
medical decisions with serious consequences for one’s health may further exacerbate anxiety 415 
among people who are math anxious. We did not seek out highly math anxious individuals. 416 
Thus, our current findings may be conservative about the potential effects of math anxiety on 417 
understanding medical risks. How affective factors such as math anxiety impact on risk 418 
communication and medical decision-making is a fruitful topic for further investigations and 419 
is one that is currently under-studied.  420 
 421 
 422 
 423 
 424 
 425 
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
 
Experiment 1 
(n = 201) 
Experiment 2 
(n = 210) 
  (s) or 
Percentage 
 (s) or 
Percentage 
Age 36.28 (12.75) 33.18 (9.93) 
Male gender 52% 54% 
Education   
High school 100% 99% 
College 64% 71% 
Graduate school 11% 17% 
Household income   
$10,000 or less 8% 14% 
$10,001 - $40,000 41% 41% 
$40,001 - $70,000 28% 21% 
$70,000 or more 23% 23% 
Objective numeracy 9.71 (1.18) 9.21 (1.79) 
Math anxiety 2.19 (0.83) 2.33 (0.88) 
Note. Objective numeracy scores and math anxiety ratings  525 
are presented after removal of outliers. Objective numeracy 526 
scores are raw un-transformed scores. 527 
 528 
 529 
 530 
 531 
 532 
 533 
 534 
 535 
 536 
 537 
 538 
 539 
 540 
 541 
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Table 2. Adult Everyday Math Anxiety Scale (AEMAS) Items  
In the following you will be presented with 
some everyday situations. Please rate each 
item in terms of how anxious you would feel  Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
during the event specified (1=low anxiety, 
2=some anxiety, 3=moderate anxiety, 4=quite 
a bit of anxiety, 5=high anxiety)  s 
Item-total 
correlation  s 
Item-total 
correlation 
1. Having to work with fractions 2.19 1.17 .74 2.33 1.21 .73 
2. Having to work with percentages 1.90 1.09 .78 2.08 1.17 .76 
3. Having to work out a 15% tip 1.60 0.95 .64 1.86 1.11 .70 
4. Figuring out how much a shirt will cost if       
it is 25% off 
1.40 0.82 .55 1.71 1.02 .69 
5. Having to work out prices in a foreign 
currency 
2.86 1.22 .62 2.88 1.24 .62 
6. Looking at tables and graphs when reading 
the newspaper 
1.44 0.76 .59 1.85 1.11 .66 
7. Being presented with numerical 
information about different mobile phone 
subscription options 
1.79 1.00 .67 1.99 
 
1.04 .67 
8. Having to choose between financial 
investment options 
2.93 1.21 .65 2.85 1.16 .56 
9. Reading your bank’s leaflet about changes 
in the terms of using your credit card 
2.31 1.18 .61 2.38 
 
1.16 .65 
10. Having to complete a math course as part 
of your work training. 
2.38 1.27 .80 2.51 1.28 .76 
11. Having to sit a numeracy test as part of a 
job application process. 
2.68 1.33 .78 2.67 1.31 .77 
12. Having to present numerical information 
at a work meeting 
2.43 1.28 .77 2.59 1.25 .76 
13. Making an important decision at your 
workplace based on last year’s statistics 
2.61 1.17 .75 2.63 1.21 .73 
 542 
 543 
 544 
 545 
 546 
 547 
 548 
 549 
 550 
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Table 3. Pearson correlations 
 Experiment 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age (1) –          
Male Gender (2) -.07 –         
Education (3) .08 -.08 –        
Income (4) .10 -.02 .13 –       
Objective numeracy (5) .09 .13 .13 .18* –      
Math anxiety (6) .01 -.26** -.16* -.14* -.37** –     
Baseline Risk (7) -.14* .14* .14* .01 .17* -.20* –    
Absolute Risk (8) -.11 .13 -.05 .08 .25** -.24** .36** –   
Relative Risk (9) .07 .11 .04 .04 .25** -.09 .16* .01 –  
Absolute Confidence (10) -.11 .23** .06 .03 .35** -.32** .44** .36** .19* – 
Relative Confidence (11) -.10 .23** .09 .07 .33** -.40** .41** .31** .12 .86** 
 Experiment 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age (1) –          
Male Gender (2) -.16* –         
Education (3) .00 -.06 –        
Income (4) .09 -.06 .02 –       
Objective numeracy (5) -.07 .15* -.08 .09 –      
Math anxiety (6) .01 -.21* .02 .04 -.50* –     
Baseline Risk (7) .00 .04 -.03 -.01 .12 -.28* –    
Treatment A Risk (8) -.07 .06 -.08 -.01 .22* -.24* .54** –   
Treatment B Risk (9) .07 .04 -.05 -.03 .21* -.14* .33** .64** –  
Treatment A Confidence (10) -.16* .17* .10 .01 .39** -.43** .21* .18* .19* – 
Treatment B Confidence (11) -.14* .22* .14* .00 .38** -.43** .19* .19* .22** .89** 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .001. Baseline, absolute, relative risks are total correct risk 551 
responses. 552 
 553 
 554 
 555 
 556 
 557 
  558 
 559 
 560 
 561 
 562 
 563 
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Table 4. Logistic regression models used to predict correct responding  
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 Odds ratio (95% CI)  Odds ratio (95% CI) 
Included Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Included Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b 
Objective 
Numeracy 
3.61** 
(2.16: 6.02) 
 3.07** 
(1.79: 5.27) 
Objective 
Numeracy 
4.57** 
(1.84: 11.32) 
 3.60* 
(1.30: 9.93) 
Math 
anxiety 
 
0.51** 
(0.36: 0.71) 
0.76 
(0.54: 1.06) 
Math 
anxiety 
 
0.29** 
(0.15: 0.56) 
0.71 
(0.35: 1.45) 
Baseline 
risk 
22.45** 
(12.97: 38.88) 
22.00** 
(12.72: 38.05) 
22.42** 
(12.95: 38.80) 
Baseline 
risk 
4.37** 
(2.06: 9.29) 
4.59** 
(2.20: 9.60) 
4.37** 
(2.06: 9.29) 
Relative 
risk 
0.11** 
(0.07: 0.17) 
0.11** 
(0.07: 0.17) 
0.11** 
(0.07: 0.17) 
Treatment B 3.07* 
(1.51: 6.28) 
2.74* 
(1.38: 5.44) 
3.07* 
(1.51: 6.28) 
Scenario 
context 
1.26 
(0.90: 1.76) 
1.26 
(0.90: 1.75) 
1.26 
(0.90: 1.76) 
Display 0.48 
(0.16: 1.43) 
0.73 
(0.24: 2.21) 
0.52 
(0.18: 1.57) 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .001. In Experiment 1, the baseline and relative risk are in comparison 564 
to the absolute risk. In Experiment 2, the baseline and Treatment B risk are in comparison to 565 
the Treatment A risk. R
2
McFadden; Model 1a = 0.37, Model 2a = 0.35, Model 3a = 0.37, Model 566 
1b = 0.15, Model 2b = 0.06, Model 3b = 0.15. 567 
 568 
 569 
 570 
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Table 5. Linear regression models used to predict confidence ratings  
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 Unstandardized beta (95% CI)  Unstandardized beta (95% CI) 
Included Model 1a Model 2a Included Model 1b Model 2b 
Objective 
Numeracy 
0.86**  
(0.39: 1.34) 
0.86**  
(0.39: 1.34) 
Objective 
Numeracy 
0.54* 
(0.12: 0.97) 
0.51* 
(0.10: 0.93) 
Math anxiety -0.59**  
(-0.90: -0.29) 
-0.32  
(-0.70: 0.07) 
Math anxiety -0.62**  
(-.86: -0.37) 
-1.58**  
(-2.25: -0.91) 
Relative risk -0.32**  
(-0.45: -0.19) 
0.09  
(-0.28: 0.45) 
Treatment B  0.15*  
(0.05: 0.25) 
0.15*  
(0.05: 0.25) 
Scenario context  0.01 
 (-0.12: 0.14) 
0.01 
 (-0.12: 0.14) 
Display 0.41*  
(0.05: 0.77) 
-1.04* 
 (-2.05: -0.03) 
Math anxiety x 
relative risk 
 
-0.19* 
 (-0.34: -0.03) 
Display x Math 
Anxiety 
 
0.62* 
 (0.22: 1.03) 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .001. The relative risk is comparison to the absolute risk in 584 
Models 1a and 2a. The Treatment B risk is in comparison to the Treatment A risk in 585 
Models 1b and 2b. R
2
; Model 1a = 0.16, Model 2a = 0.16, Model 1b = 0.22,  586 
Model 2b = 0.26. 587 
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 604 
Figure 1. An example of the graphical display presented to participants in Experiment 2. The 605 
absolute risk reduction is displayed out of 100 patients for Treatment A and out of 1,000 606 
participants for Treatment B. Participants were asked for each treatment how many patients 607 
among 1,000 would die. 608 
 609 
